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GOD’S (PENSION) PLAN: ERISA CHURCH 
PLAN LITIGATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
ADVOCATE HEALTH CARE NETWORK v. 
STAPLETON 
Abstract: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pro-
tects the pensions of American workers by placing vesting, funding, and fiduci-
ary obligations on plan sponsors. “Church plans” established and maintained by 
church organizations, however, are exempt from the provisions of ERISA to 
avoid entanglement between church and state. After the enactment of ERISA and 
its church plan exemption, federal agencies and courts long-debated which pen-
sion plans qualified as church plans, culminating in the 2017 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton. In Stapleton, the Su-
preme Court adopted a broad interpretation of a church plan, under which plans 
could either be established and maintained by a church or church-affiliated or-
ganization, or maintained by a qualifying church-affiliated organization, regard-
less of who established it. Since this decision, federal courts have largely refused 
claims brought by litigants who are members of church plans maintained by 
church-affiliated organizations. Many of these litigants have pursued alternative 
recourse, including settling out of court or seeking damages in state court. This 
Note demonstrates the limited options left for participants in and beneficiaries of 
church plans after the Stapleton decision, and examines several recent church 
plan cases to assess the strengths and weaknesses of various post-Stapleton strat-
egies. This Note finally proposes a call for reform of the ERISA church plan ex-
emption and a state statutory law response. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Karen Bradley learned that the entire pension on which she was 
relying for retirement was gone.1 Ms. Bradley was a nurse for twenty-four 
years at St. Clare’s Hospital of Schenectady, New York (St. Clare’s), where her 
father had previously worked as a pharmacist.2 Time and time again, St. 
Clare’s promised her a pension, and she planned her retirement believing that 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Chris Arnold, ‘Why Is There Nothing Left?’ Pension Funds Failing at Catholic Hospitals, NPR 
(Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/03/763512852/why-is-there-nothing-left-pension-funds-
failing-at-catholic-hospitals [https://perma.cc/5GCB-VLKP]. Karen Bradley learned in a letter that St. 
Clare’s Hospital of Schenectady, New York (St. Clare’s) would no longer be able to provide her with 
a pension. Id.  
 2 Id. Ms. Bradley was fifty-six years old at the time of her interview with NPR in 2019. Id. 
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she would have this source of income.3 Ms. Bradley was not the only employ-
ee operating under this mistaken belief.4 Another St. Clare’s employee, Mary 
Hartshorne, purchased a small home on a lake for her retirement.5 She, too, 
based her decision on the promise of receiving pension funds.6 When Ms. 
Hartshorne discovered that she lost thirty percent of her anticipated pension, 
she sold her home because she was unable to maintain the mortgage pay-
ments.7 In 2018, St. Clare’s revealed that it would no longer be able to meet its 
pension obligations due to underfunding of the plan.8 As a result, Ms. Bradley 
and Ms. Hartshorne, along with over 600 participants in the St. Clare’s pension 
plan, lost their entire pension, and an additional group of participants over the 
age of sixty-two lost some part of it.9 Soon thereafter, the AARP Foundation 
filed suit against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New York (Albany 
Diocese) on behalf of the former employees of St. Clare’s in the N.Y. Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. (emphasizing that Ms. Bradley chose to work for such a long period of time at this hospital, 
at least in part, because of the promise of the pension when she retired). The St. Clare’s pension plan 
was a defined-benefit plan. See Complaint at 21, Hartshorne v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, 
N.Y., 129 N.Y.S.3d 268 (Sup. Ct. 2020) (No. 2019-1989) (recounting St. Clare’s promise to pay de-
fined-pension benefits to the plan beneficiaries). Employers generally determine private-defined-
benefit pension plan distributions based off the number of years of employment, thus giving employ-
ees incentive to stay longer. See Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/
general/topic/retirement/typesofplans [https://perma.cc/4H78-BC67] (clarifying that a defined-benefit 
plan beneficiary receives a set amount of income per month during retirement, whereas a defined-
contribution plan beneficiary receives a lump sum upon retirement). 
 4 See Arnold, supra note 1 (profiling additional beneficiaries of St. Clare’s pension plan). Accord-
ing to Dara Smith, an attorney with the AARP Foundation, several former St. Clare’s employees were 
relying on their pension to be the sole source of their retirement income. Id. Therefore, when St. 
Clare’s terminated the plan abruptly, it was “devastating.” Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. Mary Hartshorne was part of a group of employees over the age of sixty-two who only lost 
part of their pensions. Id. NPR reported that Ms. Hartshorne became emotional when she spoke about 
losing the home in which she had planned to retire and admitted that the loss took a toll on her. Id. 
 8 Complaint, supra note 3, at 19–21. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New York (Albany 
Diocese) was the original sponsor of St. Clare’s, a not-for-profit corporation operated out of the Alba-
ny Diocese’s offices. Id. at 6–7. The hospital operated by St. Clare’s closed and transferred its assets 
to Ellis Hospital in 2008, and formally filed a petition for dissolution with the New York Attorney 
General on March 22, 2019, in accordance with Article 11 of New York’s Not-For-Profit Corporation 
Laws. Id. at 9, 18; see N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 1101–1115 (McKinney 2019) (outlining 
the procedures for a judicial dissolution of a non-profit corporation in New York). It stated in its peti-
tion for dissolution that its only creditor was the St. Clare’s Hospital Retirement Income Plan (St. 
Clare’s Plan), to which it owed $53,500,000. Complaint, supra note 3, at 9. The New York Attorney 
General objected to the petition for dissolution, noting that the corporation promised pensions to 1,100 
former employees, and additionally, that the directors of the corporation had a duty to act in accord-
ance with the Catholic value of workers’ rights as an element of their fiduciary duty of obedience. Id. 
at 9–10.  
 9 Complaint, supra note 3, at 19–21. 
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Court, Schenectady County, alleging a breach of contract, a promissory estop-
pel claim, and a breach of fiduciary duty.10 
In many ways, the St. Clare’s plan was similar to other defined-benefit 
pension plans.11 In a typical defined-benefit pension plan, an employer invests 
money on behalf of participating employees over the course of their employ-
ments, and then distributes regular monthly payments to the participating em-
ployees following their retirements.12 Employees’ rights to their pension bene-
fits typically only vest, or become non-forfeitable, when they have worked for 
their employer for a certain length of time or reached a certain retirement 
age.13 If a defined-benefit plan terminates, a federal agency, the Pension Bene-
fit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), may continue to pay beneficiaries their 
monthly retirement benefits.14 
“Church plans,” however, are exempt from the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal law that creates and enforces 
rules for pension plans, including funding, vesting, insurance, and fiduciary 
obligations.15 Generally, employers that are churches or church-affiliated or-
ganizations do not need to comply with ERISA.16 St. Clare’s Hospital Retire-
                                                                                                                           
 10 Id. at 4, 28; see Docket: Employee Pensions and Benefits, AARP FOUND. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://
www.aarp.org/aarp-foundation/our-work/legal-advocacy/afl-docket-employee-benefits1.html?cq_ck=
1450612867152 [https://perma.cc/UV6E-NYTW] (providing information about the AARP Founda-
tion’s work on this case). The plaintiffs in the suit were all former employees of St. Clare’s. Deci-
sion/Order at 2, Hartshorne, 129 N.Y.S.3d 268 (No. 2019-1989); Complaint, supra note 3, at 4. 
 11 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 21 (describing the agreement that St. Clare’s made to the plain-
tiffs in written documents to pay pension benefits upon retirement on the condition of accrual of their 
services). 
 12 COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 
21 (5th ed. 2018). A defined-contribution plan is an alternative retirement plan that has been gaining 
popularity since the 1980s. Id. These plans work differently than defined-benefit pension plans. Id. at 
21–22. A defined-contribution plan is more like a savings account, where an employer invests a por-
tion of an employee’s salary over time. Id. Then, upon retirement, the employee usually receives the 
income from this account in the form of a lump sum. Id. at 22. 
 13 Id. at 11. Sections 202 and 203 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) regulate the area of pension vesting. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052–1053 (2018). They establish the 
maximum vesting requirements an employer may impose, as well as how much of an employee’s 
accrued benefits under a plan can be forfeited if the employee leaves the company before meeting the 
minimum vesting requirements. Id. 
 14 See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (establishing the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) within 
the Department of Labor (DOL)). A defined-benefit plan covered by the PBGC can terminate in two 
ways. How Pension Plans End, PBGC (last updated Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.pbgc.gov/about/pg/
other/how-pension-plans-end [https://perma.cc/82QS-WEDZ]. In a standard termination, the plan has 
enough funds to cover its pension obligations. Id. In a distress termination, the PBGC uses its funds, 
as well as any remaining funds in the plan, to continue making payments to plan participants. Id. 
 15 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(b), 1003(b)(2) (setting forth the statutory scheme of ERISA and establishing 
an exemption for church plans). Other exemptions from ERISA include governmental plans, plans 
that only exist to comply with disability insurance laws or workman’s or unemployment compensation 
laws, plans administered outside of the United States for nonresidents, and unfunded excess benefit 
plans. Id. § 1003(b)(1), (3)–(5). 
 16 Id. § 1003(b)(2). 
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ment Income Plan (St. Clare’s Plan), because of its oversight by the Catholic 
Diocese, fell into the category of a church plan.17 As a result, many of its em-
ployees lost their entire pension plans and were left with no recourse in federal 
court when St. Clare’s dissolved.18 
St. Clare’s employees are not alone; according to one estimate, around a 
million Americans are participants in or beneficiaries of church plans run by 
Catholic-affiliated institutions, and consequently are left equally as vulnera-
ble.19 Part I of this Note discusses the political and social history of ERISA.20 
Part I also examines the protections of ERISA as they apply to covered retire-
ment plans and the church plan exemption.21 It then explores the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2017 decision in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton (Staple-
ton II), where the Court adopted a broad reading of the church plan exemp-
tion.22 Part II outlines litigation post-Stapleton II, narrowing in on several rep-
resentative case studies.23 These case studies demonstrate the possible recours-
es available to litigants, including attempting to dispute church plan status in 
federal court, filing in state court, and settling outside of court altogether.24 
Finally, Part III argues that the options left for litigants post-Stapleton II offer 
little to no protections against misuse of their relied-upon pensions.25 Part III 
proposes to resolve this problem through congressional legislative reform and 
a state-law response.26 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Complaint, supra note 3, at 15. Around 1992, the Albany Diocese requested and received a 
Private Letter Ruling (PLR) from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) declaring the St. Clare’s pension 
fund to be a church plan. Id. Accordingly, St. Clare’s was exempt from ERISA requirements, includ-
ing minimum funding requirements and the mandate to purchase pension insurance through PBGC, 
the federally chartered corporation responsible for insuring pension plans under ERISA. Id.; see 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1301–1461 (containing the provisions establishing the PBGC). In fact, the Albany Diocese 
received $88,000 from the PBGC for past insurance premiums that they paid before the PLR. Com-
plaint, supra note 3, at 15–16. 
 18 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 11, 15 (arguing that the St. Clare’s church plan status left em-
ployee pensions unprotected). 
 19 Scott James, Faith in a ‘Hidden Paycheck’ That Could Vanish for Good, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/business/retirement/faith-in-a-hidden-paycheck-that-
could-vanish-for-good.html [https://perma.cc/XJB8-VSU4]. As this figure does not include organiza-
tions affiliated with other religions, the number of Americans who are beneficiaries or participants in 
church plans is likely much higher than this figure. See id. (citing Dara Smith, a senior attorney with 
the AARP Foundation, who limited her estimate to Catholic-affiliated organizations). 
 20 See infra notes 35–58 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 59–112 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 113–164 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 165–223 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 165–223 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 224–272 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 224–272 and accompanying text. 
2020] ERISA Church Plan Litigation in the Aftermath of Stapleton 3011 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ERISA AND ITS CHURCH PLAN EXEMPTION 
ERISA regulates the provision of private employee-benefit plans, includ-
ing retirement plans, through several different standards and requirements.27 
When enacting ERISA, however, Congress chose to exempt certain types of 
employee-benefit plans from coverage, including church plans.28 Debate about 
the definition of a church plan led to extensive litigation and many administra-
tive rulings, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Stapleton 
II.29 Section A of this Part briefly discusses the legislative and political history 
behind the enactment of ERISA, as well as the basic protections it provides for 
typical private pension plans in federal courts.30 Section B then focuses on the 
church plan exemption, including its purpose, function, and evolution over 
time.31 Finally, Section C examines Stapleton II and explains that the Supreme 
Court adopted a broad interpretation of the definition of a church plan.32 It also 
provides an overview of state-law claims remaining for church plan litigants 
post-Stapleton II.33 Section C focuses on legislation in Rhode Island from 2019 
that brought church plans under the annual reporting requirement of ERISA.34 
A. ERISA: “A Minor Miracle” 
Before Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, the federal government regulat-
ed pensions and employee benefits through several laws that were narrow in 
                                                                                                                           
 27 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (setting forth ERISA’s statutory scheme). Twenty-two percent of 
American workers participate in a defined-benefit pension plan. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, MARCH 2018, at 2 tbl.2 (2018), https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2018/employee-
benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BZL-VTV9]. Fifty-five percent of 
workers participate in a general-workplace-retirement plan, suggesting that many workers may not 
participate in a private pension plan, but may still have a workplace-retirement savings plan. See id. 
(containing data on the retirement benefits of civilian American workers). The popularity of pension 
plans, however, has steadily decreased over the last several decades. E.g., William J. Wiatrowski, The 
Last Private Industry Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2012, at 1, 3 (de-
scribing the current state of private-defined-benefit pension plans). More workers are relying on their 
own savings, social security, or 401(k) defined contribution plans, as plan sponsors have come to see 
defined-benefit plans as costly and risky, and the power of unions wane. See Nathan Bomey, 4 Rea-
sons the Corporate Pension Is on Its Deathbed, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/money/2019/10/07/ge-pension-freeze-reasons-defined-benefit-plans-are-dead/3898630002/ 
[https://perma.cc/4K4B-KEHC] (describing the declining popularity of pension plans in the private 
sector).  
 28 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (describing the different exemptions to ERISA). 
 29 See Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton (Stapleton II), 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1654 (2017) 
(resolving differences of interpretation at the district and circuit court levels as to the definition of a 
church plan). 
 30 See infra notes 35–78 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 79–112 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 113–138 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 113–138 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 139–164 and accompanying text. 
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scope.35 Initially, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indirectly regulated pri-
vate pension plans through the Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926, which both 
offered tax incentives to plan sponsors.36 These statutes allowed employers to 
deduct their contributions to employee pension funds and enabled employees 
to defer recognition of the income from the growth of the fund until they re-
ceived the money through a distribution upon retirement.37 For a plan to re-
ceive this special tax treatment, it must meet tax qualification status by adher-
ing to certain coverage and contribution requirements.38 Under the Revenue 
Act of 1942, the IRS imposed stricter requirements for plan sponsors to receive 
tax qualification, including a disclosure mandate.39 Congress subsequently 
passed the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA) in 1958, 
which required plan administrators to disclose certain information about the 
plan to beneficiaries.40 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See History of EBSA and ERISA, EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa [https://perma.cc/DJN5-5P2C] (noting 
that the IRS and DOL regulated pension plans under prior statutory frameworks). 
 36 Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9; Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 
42 Stat. 227; History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 35. 
 37 § 219(f), 44 Stat. at 33–34; § 219(f), 42 Stat. at 247; History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 
36. A similar type of tax qualification for pension funds exists today. See I.R.C. § 410(a) (2018) (set-
ting forth the current requirements for tax qualification status). If ERISA covers a plan that complies 
with the requirements of § 410(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, it is a qualified plan, eligible for 
certain tax benefits. Id. This preferential tax treatment constitutes a tax expenditure on the part of the 
federal government, essentially forgoing some amount of immediate tax revenue to incentivize both 
employees to participate in retirement savings plans, and employers to bring their plans into compli-
ance. See Tax Expenditures for Retirement Plans, PENSION RIGHTS CTR. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.
pensionrights.org/publications/fact-sheet/tax-expenditures-retirement-plans [https://perma.cc/V2EW-
93K6].  
 38 See History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 35 (describing how plans qualified for preferential 
tax treatment under the Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926). 
 39 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798; History of EBSA and ERISA, supra 
note 35 (describing the Revenue Act of 1942). 
 40 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 5, 72 Stat. 997, 999 (1958) 
(repealed 1974). The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA) exempted churches from 
coverage. Id. § 4(b)(3). This was a result of the fact that it excluded plans administered by non-profit 
organizations described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which included organizations 
operated exclusively for religious purposes. Id.; see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2019) (allowing a federal 
tax exemption for certain non-profit organizations). The WPPDA’s church exemption is the only 
exemption in the WPPDA that differs materially from the exemptions eventually included in ERISA. 
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (listing the comparable exemptions from ERISA coverage), with 
§ 4(b)(1)–(4), 72 Stat. at 998–99 (listing exemptions from WPPDA coverage). Congress amended the 
WPPDA in 1962, largely focusing on the specific mechanics of the reporting and disclosure require-
ments. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35; 
G. Robert Blakey, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, 38 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 263, 264, 269–85 (1962–1963) (detailing the background and contents of the 1962 amend-
ments). President John F. Kennedy also directed the formation of an executive committee to conduct 
studies to better understand the needs of private pensioners. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CORP. 
PENSION FUNDS & OTHER PRIVATE RET. & WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE 
PENSION PROGRAMS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 
2020] ERISA Church Plan Litigation in the Aftermath of Stapleton 3013 
Although Congress had several motivations for enacting ERISA, one was 
the infamous story of Studebaker-Packard Corporation’s (Studebaker-Packard) 
plant closing.41 In 1963, Studebaker-Packard closed an automotive assembly 
plant in South Bend, Indiana.42 At the time of the closing, the company’s pen-
sion plan liabilities exceeded its assets by fifteen million dollars.43 When Unit-
ed Auto Workers (UAW), a powerful labor union representing auto workers, 
negotiated the pension plan with Studebaker-Packard in 1949 and 1950, the 
parties decided that the plan should not give any vested rights to employees 
until they were eligible for retirement.44 These limited vesting rights allowed 
                                                                                                                           
app. c (1965) (containing President Kennedy’s memorandum requesting the creation of a committee). 
In 1962, President Kennedy officially organized the President’s Committee on Corporate Pension 
Funds. Id. He noted that the amendments to the WPPDA had already created an enforcement mecha-
nism, including penalties for fund embezzlement, so the report focused on how appropriate funding 
and vesting requirements could assist pensioners. Id.  
 41 See Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the Private Pension Plan 
Reform Movement, in JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 78, 78 (5th 
ed. 2010) (characterizing the Studebaker-Packard Corporation (Studebaker-Packard) closing as the 
catalyzing event for federal regulation of employee benefits). Another event that spurred public inter-
est in pension reform was the 1972 National Broadcasting Company documentary Pensions: The 
Broken Promise. Id. at 81; Pensions: The Broken Promise (NBC television broadcast Sept. 12, 1972). 
The broadcast profiled workers with private pension plans, and whose employers allegedly took away 
their pensions. See ERISA 40 Timeline Alternate, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/featured/
erisa40/timeline/alternative [https://perma.cc/N6T6-NF7J]. The broadcast was well-received and won 
a Peabody award. Pensions: The Broken Promise, PEABODY, http://www.peabodyawards.com/award-
profile/pensions-the-broken-promise [https://perma.cc/CDA4-KXFW]. 
 42 JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITI-
CAL HISTORY 51 (2004) [hereinafter WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ERISA] (outlining the 
Studebaker-Packard plant closing and the political history of ERISA generally). The automobile mar-
ket in the United States was profitable after World War II, and the Studebaker Corporation (Stu-
debaker) and Packard Corporation (Packard), two mid-sized automotive manufacturers, were inde-
pendently successful. Id. at 53. But by 1953, car sales decreased due to a recession and reduction in 
defense spending. Id. at 53–54. Ford Motors responded by keeping production steady and lowering 
prices; however, smaller companies could not compete. Id. at 54. Studebaker and Packard merged in 
1954, forming the Studebaker-Packard Corporationbecause of these outside pressures. Id. At the time 
of merger, however, both companies were struggling financially. Id. at 56. 
 43 James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-
Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 726 (2001) [hereinafter 
Wooten, The Studebaker-Packard Story] (discussing the role of the Studebaker-Packard plant’s clos-
ing in the eventual enactment of ERISA). 
 44 WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 42, at 54. An employee “vests,” or 
gains a non-forfeitable right to the pension fund, at a specified time. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 
214–15 (1973) (listing vesting as the first of the major issues the then-titled Employee Benefit Securi-
ty Act was designed to address). If they or their employer terminates employment before then, the 
employee has no interest in the fund and does not receive any retirement benefit. Id. ERISA includes 
provisions regulating minimum vesting requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 1053. For defined-benefit plans, 
employers can either impose five-year cliff vesting, whereby an employee is not vested in any portion 
of the fund until five years of employment, or a seven-year graduated vesting schedule, whereby an 
employee vests in a certain percentage of the fund with each year of service. Id.; see also MEDILL, 
supra note 12, at 141–42 (outlining the vesting requirements for different types of retirement plans). 
Therefore, the strict vesting requirements Studebaker-Packard imposed upon their employees (i.e. no 
3014 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:3007 
the corporation to pay higher pensions to eligible employees because fewer 
employees would qualify.45 The negotiated contract did not obligate Stu-
debaker-Packard, however, to actually pay out these retirement benefits; the 
contract simply required Studebaker-Packard to make regular contributions to 
the pension trust.46 As a result, although retirement-age workers received their 
full pension in 1963, younger hourly workers received only a fraction of their 
contributions, and some received nothing.47 In the end, Studebaker-Packard laid 
off 2,900 employees with no vested rights to the pension plan, and an additional 
4,000 employees who received only a portion of their accrued benefits.48 
An oft-discussed aspect of the Studebaker-Packard incident was that em-
ployees had no recourse under existing federal and state law.49 Studebaker-
Packard had lawfully contracted away any obligation to pay out retirement 
benefits, ensuring that the corporation could not be liable for a breach of con-
tract claim under state law.50 The company also did not engage in blatantly 
fraudulent or criminal behavior.51 Some scholars have concluded that the un-
                                                                                                                           
vesting until eligibility to retire) would be impermissible under plans subject to ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1053 (setting forth ERISA’s vesting requirements); WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ERISA, 
supra note 42, at 54 (describing the vesting requirements negotiated by the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) and Studebaker-Packard). 
 45 WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 42, at 54–55. 
 46 Id. at 53. 
 47 Id. at 51. Notably, Studebaker-Packard previously terminated its pension plan for participants 
in the original Packard plan in 1958. Id. at 61. After the companies merged, Studebaker-Packard could 
no longer afford to fund both plans. Id. 
 48 Allen, supra note 41, at 79 (describing the Studebaker-Packed termination agreement). Stu-
debaker-Packard divided plan participants into three groups. Id. The first group was 3,600 participants 
who had reached sixty, the minimum retirement age. Id. They received their full lifetime annuities. Id. 
The second group was 4,000 employees who were below sixty but had a vested interest in the plan. Id. 
This group received approximately 15% of the value of their lifetime annuities in a lump sum pay-
ment. Id. The third group was approximately 2,900 employees who had no vested rights and received 
nothing. Id. 
 49 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 83 (noting that even when the overall compa-
ny was solvent, participants in the plan did not have any recourse); see also WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 42, at 53 (explaining that Studebaker-Packard only promised to direct 
payments into the plan, but did not promise to distribute funds from the plan to the participants). In 
fact, participants in the Studebaker-Packard plan did not sue after the company terminated the plan. 
See Allen, supra note 41, at 79 (noting further that the only lawsuit resulting from the closure was 
based on a company health program). 
 50 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 83 (noting that companies at the time of Stu-
debaker-Packard often formulated the plan contract to place the risk of plan funding onto the partici-
pants, rather than on the company, and then explaining that Studebaker-Packard complied with the 
contribution requirements); WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 42, at 53 (de-
scribing the Studebaker plan contract, where employees could retire at a minimum age of sixty, or a 
maximum age of sixty-eight). 
 51 See WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 42, at 51 (noting specifically 
that Studebaker-Packard did not misuse plan funds). 
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derfunding of the Studebaker-Packard plan was a predictable consequence of 
what were common pension management practices at the time.52 
The closing of the Studebaker-Packard plant became a catalyst for pen-
sion reform, including encouraging lawmakers to seriously consider creating a 
federal termination insurance system.53 Additionally, although the UAW was 
previously reluctant to promote federal termination insurance, union leaders 
saw the Studebaker-Packard shutdown as an example of the dangers of the 
pension law status quo.54 Union officials worked alongside Senator Vance 
Hartke of Indiana to introduce the Federal Reinsurance of Private Pensions Act 
in 1964.55 As a result, when President Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law in 
1974, the concept of termination insurance was a firmly established element of 
pension reform.56 Yet, the story of Studebaker-Packard also helped eventually 
lead to the signing of ERISA, even in the face of initial opposition from labor 
unions as well as employers.57 Consequently, in 1974, the New York Times 
called these reform measures a “minor miracle.”58 
ERISA, in its broadest sense, creates a federal standard for employer-
provided retirement and health plans, preempts state laws related to employee 
benefits, provides consistent remedies, and gives litigants access to the federal 
court system.59 The statute begins with a statement of congressional findings 
                                                                                                                           
 52 E.g., id. (“Studebaker and the United Auto Workers union agreed to plan terms that exposed 
younger workers to the risk that the plan would default. This default risk materialized when Stu-
debaker closed the plant in South Bend.”). 
 53 Wooten, The Studebaker-Packard Story, supra note 43, at 733. Termination insurance requires 
employers with defined-benefit pension plans to pay premiums into an insurance fund. General FAQs 
About PBGC, PBGC, https://www.pbgc.gov/about/faq/pg/general-faqs-about-pbgc [https://perma.cc/
G69Z-YLGB]. Then, if the plan terminates, the insurance fund continues to pay plan participants a set 
amount. Id. Pension plans may terminate by (1) standard termination, where the employer must 
demonstrate that it has enough money to pay all benefits, or (2) distress termination, if the plan is not 
fully funded and the employer is bankrupt or insolvent. How Pension Plans End, supra note 14 (de-
scribing methods by which pension plans covered by ERISA may end). 
 54 See Wooten, The Studebaker-Packard Story, supra note 43, at 733 (quoting UAW leaders call-
ing Studebaker-Packard a “focusing event” for pension reform). Union leaders were previously reluc-
tant to call for pension reforms because negotiated features such as limited vesting or limited contrac-
tual duties on the part of the employer were a way to ensure that the maximum number of workers 
could receive a pension in some form. See AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, THE DE-
BATE ON PRIVATE PENSIONS: A SURVEY OF THE LEGISLATURE PROPOSALS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
ISSUES 42–43 (1968) (describing the catch-22 about pension negotiations, wherein immediate vesting 
for all participants could bankrupt the employer, but offering no pension plan at all that would hurt an 
employer’s competitiveness in the marketplace).  
 55 S. 3071, 88th Cong. (1964); Wooten, The Studebaker-Packard Story, supra note 43, at 734–35. 
 56 See Wooten, The Studebaker-Packard Story, supra note 43, at 739 (emphasizing the role that 
the Studebaker closing had on Congressional and Executive considerations about employee pension 
protection). 
 57 See Wooten, The Studebaker-Packard Story, supra note 43, at 733. 
 58 Pension Security, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1974, at 36.  
 59 Kristofer C. Neslund, ERISA’s Church Plan Exemption: Freedom of Religion Overreached—
Part 1, 26 TAX’N EXEMPTS 36, 36 (2014). 
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and policy emphasizing that employee-benefit plans can affect the well-being 
and economic security of millions of Americans.60 According to Congress, 
these plans do not just affect their beneficiaries; they also affect labor relations 
and the national public interest at large.61 Therefore, Congress believed it had a 
legitimate interest in imposing reporting requirements, setting standards of 
conduct, and ensuring remedies.62 
ERISA contains four separate titles.63 First, Title I encompasses the bulk 
of ERISA’s requirements, provides for a civil statutory enforcement mecha-
nism, and sets forth provisions regarding preemption of state law.64 Specifical-
ly, ERISA requires plan sponsors to furnish plan participants with a Summary 
Plan Description (SPD), to file annual reports with the Secretary of Labor, and 
to provide notice of modifications or changes to the plan.65 ERISA also speci-
fies the length of service an employer can require before an employee may 
begin to participate in a benefit plan or gain a vested interest in the employee’s 
accrued benefits.66 ERISA requires employee-benefit-plan sponsors to have a 
written document naming at least one officer who is bound by fiduciary obliga-
tions under ERISA.67 For single-employer-defined-benefit plans, ERISA im-
poses minimum funding levels as calculated by the employer’s minimum con-
tribution amounts.68 Beneficiaries and participants in a plan can bring a civil 
action for their benefits under this Title, and the government can impose crimi-
nal penalties on plan sponsors who willfully violate certain provisions.69 Last-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (asserting that the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution empow-
ers Congress to enact ERISA). The Commerce Clause gives Congress far-reaching authority to “regu-
late commerce” between states. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Commerce Clause, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 61 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (noting further that pension plans affect the very revenue of the United 
States through their preferential tax treatment, thus invoking a particular congressional interest). 
 62 See id. (justifying the enactment of ERISA under Congress’s power to regulate interstate com-
merce and the federal taxing power). 
 63 MEDILL, supra note 12, at 29; see also PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) 6–7 
(2009), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc822611/m2/1/high_res_d/RL34443_2009May
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB4C-GHAJ]. 
 64 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1191c; MEDILL, supra note 12, at 29. In general, ERISA preempts any state 
law that addresses employee-benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144. Notably, any plans exempt from ERISA 
coverage are also exempt from ERISA preemption. Id. Therefore, state law regarding church plans is 
not preempted by ERISA. See id. (exempting from preemption any plans excluded under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1003(b)). 
 65 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1031. 
 66 Id. §§ 1051–1061. 
 67 Id. §§ 1101–1114. 
 68 29 U.S.C.A. § 1083 (West 2019).  
 69 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1151. 
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ly, Title I stipulates that ERISA supersedes all state laws relating to employee-
benefit plans, except laws regulating insurance.70 
Title II amends the Internal Revenue Code to align with the standards set 
forth in Title I, including its mandates for vesting and benefit accrual.71 Title 
III establishes dual authority to enforce Titles I and II between the Department 
of Labor (DOL) and IRS, a bureau of the Department of Treasury (DOT).72 
Finally, Title IV addresses termination insurance and creates the PBGC to op-
erate as a new federal pension insurance program.73 
Just a few years after ERISA’s enactment, President Jimmy Carter submit-
ted the Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 to the Senate.74 The goals of the Re-
organization Plan were to make division of enforcement authority over ERISA 
between the IRS and DOL more streamlined and to avoid bureaucratic confu-
sion.75 Specifically, this plan gave the DOT authority to regulate minimum 
standards for beneficiary vesting rights, participation, and funding, with the DOL 
maintaining veto power.76 The DOL also obtained authority over fiduciary 
standards, such as enforcing prohibitions on certain transactions which would be 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A). The preemption clause begins by superseding any state law relating to 
an employee-benefit plan, except plans exempt under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a), including church plans. Id. 
§ 1144(a). Next, the so-called “savings clause” allows state laws to regulate insurance, banking, and 
securities. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A); MEDILL, supra note 12, at 727. This provision ends with the so-called 
“deemer clause,” which nevertheless preempts state laws that construe an employee-benefit plan as an 
insurance company, unless the plan is otherwise exempt under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(b)(2)(B); MEDILL, supra note 12, at 727. The preemption provision is notoriously complicat-
ed; Justice Blackmun once referred to it as “perhaps . . . not a model of legislative drafting.” Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (determining whether a Massachusetts stat-
ute regulated insurance within the meaning of the ERISA preemption exception). The purpose of the 
preemption clause is to facilitate consistent employee benefits law across the United States, in order to 
keep down costs for plan participants and encourage employers to offer these plans without fear of 
complex, inconsistent state laws. Katherine A. McAllister, A Distinction Without a Difference? ERISA 
Preemption and the Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-on-Divorce and Slayer Statutes, 
52 B.C. L. REV. 1481, 1486 (2011). 
 71 ERISA (Title II, Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code Relating to Retirement Plans), 
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 898 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); MEDILL, 
supra note 12, at 29. 
 72 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1242; MEDILL, supra note 12, at 29. 
 73 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1461; MEDILL, supra note 12, at 29–30. Notably, the PBGC does not insure 
defined-contribution plans, profit-sharing plans, 401(k), 403(b), thrift/savings plans, and stock-bonus 
plans. PURCELL & STAMAN , supra note 63, at 56. 
 74 Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713, 47,713 (Aug. 10, 1978) (codified at 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2510 (2020)) (dividing authority over the administration of ERISA). 
 75 Statement on Congressional Action on Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 14 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1782–83 (Oct. 14, 1978) (containing a statement by President Jimmy Carter on the Reor-
ganization Plan No. 4 of 1978). 
 76 Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. at 47,713. 
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a conflict of interest for the employer.77 In general, both the DOL and DOT share 
the power to carry out the requirements of Titles I and II of ERISA.78 
B. The Church Plan Exemption 
The provisions of ERISA apply to the vast majority of private pension 
plans.79 A notable exception is the church plan exemption.80 Scholars have 
proposed several rationales to help explain what motivated Congress to include 
a church plan exemption in ERISA.81 First, a 1973 Senate report suggested that 
governmental control or examination of church finances could violate the Es-
tablishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.82 The Establishment Clause en-
shrines the principle of separation of church and state as well as forbids Con-
gress from making laws with respect to the establishment of religion.83 The 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. at 47,713–14. 
 78 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1242 (delegating dual authority over ERISA); MEDILL, supra note 12, 
at 29 (delineating the roles of the DOL and IRS in ERISA enforcement). 
 79 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (defining the general scope of ERISA coverage). 
 80 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)(A) (defining a church plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (listing the ex-
emptions to ERISA coverage, including the church plan exemption, as well as the governmental plan 
exemption, and certain executive-deferred compensation plans). The governmental plan exemption 
applies to any plan administered or created by the United States federal government or any state or 
local government. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(32). Plans also exempt from ERISA include those “maintained 
solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation laws or unemployment 
compensation or disability insurance laws”; “maintained outside of the United States primarily for the 
benefit of persons substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens”; and unfunded “excess benefit 
plan[s].” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3)–(5). 
 81 See Norman Stein, An Article of Faith: The Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux Church 
Plans, EMP. BENEFITS COMMITTEE NEWSL. (A.B.A., Chi., Ill.), Summer 2014, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/labor_law/publications/ebc_news_archive/issue-summer-2014/page01/ [https://
perma.cc/2M58-JTBE] (offering several possible congressional motivations behind the church plan 
exemption).  
 82 See S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 81 (1973) (expressing concerns that looking into the records of a 
religious organization could compromise the organization’s privacy in pursuing its religious activi-
ties). The report also noted that if a church organization decides to elect to fall under ERISA coverage, 
it should be able to receive termination insurance coverage with the PBGC. Id. The report proposed 
that a church plan should be covered by PBGC insurance even without making such an election, if it 
only covers employees engaged in non-religious trade or business. Id. ERISA currently does not con-
tain a provision reflecting this proposal. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (containing the church plan ex-
emption provision, with no preservation of PBGC coverage for non-electing church plan sponsors). 
 83 U.S. CONST. amend. I; S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 81. The Establishment Clause forbids Congress 
from making laws “respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. What exactly 
constitutes “establishment” has been the subject of much debate. See First Amendment and Religion, 
U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/first-amendment-
and-religion [https://perma.cc/6HMX-CVLW]. In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man set forth a three-part test for determining whether a government action violates the Establishment 
Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 
‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The First Amendment also includes 
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report concluded that there could be an Establishment Clause issue if the fed-
eral government had the right to review records regarding a church organiza-
tion’s pension fund.84 At least one commentator has also posited that legisla-
tors may have thought churches had a moral incentive to honor their promises 
to employees, and were therefore more likely to manage their pension plans 
responsibly.85 Another potential factor contributing to Congress’s decision to 
include a church exemption in ERISA was the improbability that a church in 
the 1970s would run into such serious financial trouble and cause it to inade-
quately fund its employee pensions.86 
In its original form, the exemption for church plans only applied to plans 
“established and maintained . . . by a church.”87 It also stipulated—as it still 
does today—that churches could choose to accept ERISA coverage and forego 
the exemption when electing to be a church plan.88 Once a church makes this 
irrevocable decision, its plan is subject to some Internal Revenue Code and 
ERISA provisions.89 Otherwise, the church is exempt from Title I provisions, 
                                                                                                                           
the Free Exercise Clause, which forbids Congress from “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 84 See S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 81 (expressing concern with protecting the privacy of religious 
institutions from unwarranted government intrusion). 
 85 Stein, supra note 81; see also 125 CONG. REC. S10,055 (daily ed. May 7, 1979) (statement of 
Sen. Talmadge) (entering into the record a letter from the Pension Fund of the Christian Church that 
emphasized its desire to follow Christian teachings in its economic practices). 
 86 Timothy Liam Epstein, Note, Surviving Exemption: Should the Church Exemption to ERISA 
Still Be in Effect?, 11 ELDER L.J. 395, 407 (2004). Nowadays, however, churches are increasingly 
running into financial difficulties that put their pension plans at risk. See id. (describing the various 
reasons behind these financial difficulties, ranging from sexual abuse settlements to a reduction in 
religious participation). For example, even the well-established Archdiocese of Boston filed for bank-
ruptcy after paying damages to victims of sexual abuse caused by priests. See id. (commenting on 
bankruptcy filings by dioceses in the United States). 
 87 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (1976); Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., 810 F.3d 175, 179 
(3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016), and rev’d sub nom. Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. 1652 
(2017). In the original version of the statute, § 1002(33)(A) read: “The term ‘church plan’ means (i) a 
plan established and maintained for its employees by a church or by a convention or association of 
churches, which is exempt from tax under section 501 of title 26, or (ii) a plan described in subpara-
graph (C).” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (1976); Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 179. Subsection (C) then added that 
“a plan in existence on January 1, 1974, shall be treated as a ‘church plan’ if it is established and 
maintained by a church or convention or association of churches for its employees.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(33)(C) (1976); Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 179.  
 88 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2018) (allowing church plans to elect ERISA coverage under the terms 
of I.R.C. § 410(d)); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (1976); Stein, supra note 81 (noting that churches could 
elect ERISA coverage under the original formulation of the statute as well). 
 89 See I.R.C. § 410(d) (noting that once a church plan makes the election, the provisions in Title I 
of ERISA apply). The church plan exemption is the only ERISA exemption that permits plan sponsors 
to choose to opt into ERISA coverage. Jeffrey A. Herman, Resolving ERISA’s “Church Plan” Prob-
lem, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 231, 250 (2016) (citing this fact as support for the broad interpreta-
tion of the definition of a church plan and explaining a narrow interpretation would force many church 
plans into ERISA coverage without the ability to exercise a choice to elect such coverage); see 29 
U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2018) (containing the various exemptions from ERISA coverage).  
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such as minimum vesting and disclosure requirements.90 Further, PBGC termi-
nation insurance under Title IV does not apply to church plans, unless the 
churches elect coverage.91 
As originally written, this exemption applied narrowly to clergy and other 
direct church employees, but not to employees of agencies affiliated with a 
church, such as church-affiliated hospitals.92 Additionally, a grandfather provi-
sion permitted plans covering employees of church agencies to be exempt until 
1982.93 Churches, worried by the 1982 exemption end date, began to lobby 
Congress for an extension of this provision.94 To support these efforts, twenty-
five churches formed a coalition called the Church Alliance for Clarification of 
ERISA.95 The coalition argued that after 1982, churches would be forced to 
divide their pension plans between church employees and agency employees, 
which would be a cumbersome process and lead to different pension protec-
tions for various employees.96 Adding fuel to the fire, in 1977, the IRS and 
DOT proposed changes to the Internal Revenue Code that would make reli-
gious organizations eligible for the church plan exemption only if they did not 
maintain the plan primarily for employees working in an “unrelated trade or 
business.”97 
In response to such lobbying, Congress amended ERISA’s definition of a 
church plan in 1980 as part of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments 
                                                                                                                           
 90 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2). 
 91 Id. § 1321(b)(3). 
 92 Stein, supra note 81. 
 93 Id. Therefore, after 1982, church plans would no longer include non-church employees. Id. 
Furthermore, plans maintained by church-affiliated agencies but not created by a church would not be 
eligible for the exemption. Id. 
 94 125 CONG. REC. S10,054–58 (daily ed. May 7, 1979) (statement of Sen. Talmadge) (containing 
letters submitted by churches in opposition to the sunset provision). Senator Herman Talmadge of 
Georgia expressed concern that churches would be unable to maintain their church plans if Congress 
subjected church plans maintained by church-affiliated organizations to ERISA by allowing the sunset 
provision to stand. Id. at 10,052. He argued that although businesses receive funds from other sources, 
churches rely upon tithes for their income, distinguishing church plans from other pension plans. Id. 
 95 Stein, supra note 81; see also History, CHURCH ALLIANCE, https://church-alliance.org/history 
[https://perma.cc/GUQ4-PP7F] (discussing the origins of the Church Alliance for Clarification of 
ERISA, formed in 1975). This organization still exists today, and lists on its website several more 
recent pieces of legislation its leaders have championed, such as the Church Plan Parity and Entan-
glement Prevention Act of 1999, which then-Senator for Alabama Jefferson Sessions sponsored. 
Church Plan Parity and Entanglement Prevention Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-244, 114 Stat. 499 
(2000) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144a); History, supra. 
 96 Stein, supra note 81. 
 97 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(e)-I, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,621, 18,622 (Apr. 8, 1977). According to the 
definition in the Internal Revenue Code, an “unrelated trade or business” is one that is “not substan-
tially related . . . to the exercise of performance by such organization of its . . . purpose or function 
constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501.” I.R.C. § 513(a). For a tax-exempt church, 
this suggests that the church organization would have to sponsor a pension plan mostly for employees 
fulfilling religious roles. See id. 
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Act (MPPAA).98 Following the enactment of the MPPAA, subsection (A) of 
the church plan definition states that church plans include those plans that are 
both “established and maintained” by a tax-exempt church.99 Subsection (C) 
clarifies that plans “established and maintained” by churches include plans 
maintained by organizations with the principal purposes of administering the 
plans, as long as the organizations are sufficiently associated with churches.100 
The interplay between these two subsections spurred debate regarding 
whether a plan maintained by a church-affiliated organization could be a 
church plan even if a church did not establish the plan itself.101 District courts 
that adopted a broad interpretation of both subsections held that church-
affiliated organizations can maintain a church plan not established by a 
church.102 On the other hand, circuit courts that construed a narrow interpreta-
tion held that subsection (A) read alone suggests that a church must have es-
tablished a plan maintained by a church-affiliated organization for it to qualify 
as a church plan.103 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364 § 407(a), 94 
Stat. 1208, 1303–04 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)). The definition of a church 
plan, as amended, now reads in relevant part: 
(A) The term “church plan” means a plan established and maintained . . . by a church or 
by a convention or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 
of Title 26 . . . . 
(C)(i) A plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a 
church or by a convention or association of churches includes a plan maintained by an 
organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or 
function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the provi-
sion of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or 
a convention or association of churches, if such organization is controlled by or associ-
ated with a church or a convention or association of churches . . . . 
29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)(A), (C)(i). 
 99 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)(A). A church is tax-exempt if it qualifies as a non-profit within the 
meaning of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Id. 
 100 Id. § 1002(33)(C). In 2017, in her majority opinion in Stapleton II, Justice Kagan commented 
on the complexity of this provision. 137 S. Ct. at 1656. She drafted a “user-friendly” version of sec-
tions (A) and (C): “Under paragraph (A), a ‘church plan’ means a plan established and maintained . . . 
by a church. Under subparagraph (C)(i), ‘a plan established and maintained . . . by a church . . . in-
cludes a plan maintained by a [principal-purpose] organization.’” Id. at 1658 (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1002(33)(A), (C)(i)). 
 101 Herman, supra note 89, at 232 (detailing the disagreements about the proper interpretation of a 
church plan in the district and circuit courts); see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)(A), (C)(i). 
 102 See, e.g., Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 818–19, 825–27 (E.D. Mich. 2014) 
(adopting the broad definition of a church plan and focusing on the legislative intent behind the church 
plan exemption and its subsequent amendments, as well as the IRS’s frequent adoption of the broad 
interpretation). 
 103 See, e.g., Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 177 (adopting the narrow interpretation of the church plan defi-
nition); Herman, supra note 89, at 232, 235 (explaining circuit court interpretations of subsection 
(33)(A)). 
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Historically, the IRS interpreted this provision in its Private Letter Ruling 
(PLR) process.104 PLRs are statements that the IRS issues to taxpayers upon 
request that apply tax law to the taxpayer’s purported situation.105 The IRS has 
consistently endorsed the broad interpretation of the church plan definition 
through the PLR process. For example, in 2008, the IRS concluded in a PLR 
that a church plan must be “established and maintained” for its employees by a 
church or must be administered by a church-affiliated organization.106 
Some employers seeking a PLR had previously operated as if their pen-
sion plans were subject to ERISA and had consequently paid premiums to the 
PBGC to insure their plans.107 These employers could seek a refund of the 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See Stein, supra note 81 (describing the IRS’s broad interpretation adopted in its PLRs); Emi-
ly Morrison, Note, Revisiting ERISA’s Church Plan Exemption After Advocate Health Care Network 
v. Stapleton, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1292–93, 1315–22 (2017) (outlining the history and usage of 
the PLR process in church plan determinations, and advocating for a more stringent PLR process as a 
method of addressing the church plan exemption). The DOL has also consistently adopted a broad 
interpretation of the definition of a church plan through its process of issuing advisory opinions. Her-
man, supra note 89, at 251. The DOL issues individualized advisory letters either to individuals or 
organizations about their status under ERISA or to counsel them regarding what the effects of an 
action may be. Filing Requests for ERISA Advisory Opinions: ERISA Procedure 76-1, U.S. DEP’T 
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/advisory-opinions/
filing-requests-for-erisa-aos [https://perma.cc/Q63V-DDH7]. These notices only apply to the individ-
ual or organization who requests them. Id. For example, in a 2004 advisory opinion, the DOL stated 
that a plan established and also maintained by a church-affiliated non-profit corporation fell within the 
statutory definition of a church plan. Interpretation of Title I of ERISA, Advisory Opinion, Docket 
No. 2004-11A (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 30, 2004), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-
advisers/guidance/advisory-opinions/2004-11a [https://perma.cc/6MKM-NBBL]. This advisory letter 
was in response to an inquiry by counsel for the Pittsburgh Mercy Health System and the Mercy Life 
Center Corporation. Id. The DOL deferred to a PLR that the IRS had issued to Mercy Life Center 
Corporation in 2003, and consequently designated the plan as a church plan. Id. In addition, DOL 
administrative rulings often have turned on whether the IRS had chosen to issue a PLR. See, e.g., id. 
(describing a DOL advisory opinion that chose to adopt the broad interpretation of a prior PLR). The 
PBGC has also shown significant deference to IRS PLRs because it does not typically make church 
plan determinations on its own. ENROLLED ACTUARIES PROGRAM COMM. & PENSION BENEFIT 
GUAR. CORP., 2011 ENROLLED ACTUARIES MEETING: QUESTIONS TO THE PBGC AND SUMMARY OF 
THEIR RESPONSES 25 (2011), https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/docs/2011bluebook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XYH3-7N28]. 
 105 Tax Exempt Bonds Private Letter Rulings: Some Basic Concepts, IRS (last updated Aug. 27, 
2020), https://www.irs.gov/tax-exempt-bonds/teb-private-letter-ruling-some-basic-concepts [https://
perma.cc/U4F3-4Q5J]. Although PLRs are personalized for the requesting taxpayer, they are general-
ly available for public viewing. I.R.C. § 6110(a). Courts do not consider a PLR to be binding prece-
dent on any party other than the taxpayer to whom the IRS issued the PLR. Herman, supra note 89, at 
251–52. 
 106 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 08-16-031 (Jan. 25, 2008). The IRS in this PLR offered little insight into 
its reasoning for adopting such a broad interpretation. See id. It simply wrote that either a church must 
have “established and maintained” a church plan, or a church-affiliated organization must have admin-
istered it. Id. The IRS defines church-affiliated organizations as organizations described in I.R.C. 
§ 414(e)(3)(A). Id.  
 107 See Refunds of Premiums, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,277, 63,406–07 (Dec. 1, 1993) (describing how an 
exempt plan could pay PBGC annual premiums without automatically forfeiting their exemption from 
Title I of ERISA, and also explaining how a plan could request a refund of its premiums). 
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premiums they had paid to the PBGC through a written request.108 The IRS 
purportedly refunded nearly eighteen million dollars in premiums between 
1999 and 2007 to eighty-six employers seeking exemption.109 Under the era of 
PLR interpretation of church plans, employers could receive an exemption de-
termination letter and not notify participants, even if participants had originally 
been told that the plan was subject to ERISA and insured by the PBGC.110 
In 2009, the IRS announced a moratorium on new church plan PLRs.111 
Prior to such moratorium, the IRS consistently determined that a church plan 
did not need to be established by a church, and one could be maintained by an 
administrative committee rather than the employer.112 
C. The U.S. Supreme Court Responds: Advocate Healthcare Network v. 
Stapleton 
Following the IRS’s mortarium on church plan PLRs, there was a rise in 
church plan litigation, which ultimately culminated in the 2017 Supreme Court 
case Stapleton II.113 Before the Supreme Court’s decision, federal district 
courts were inconsistent in their treatment of how narrowly or broadly to de-
fine church plan; over thirty lawsuits disputing this point were filed between 
2013 and 2016.114 
Each circuit court to address the church plan definition question chose to 
adopt the narrow interpretation.115 For example, in 2015 in Kaplan v. Saint Pe-
ter’s Healthcare System, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey’s denial 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. at 63,407. 




 110 See Stein, supra note 81 (noting that the IRS’s PLR policy did not require the IRS to tell plan 
participants about their determination, nor did it require plan sponsors to tell the participants once they 
received a determination). 
 111 Id. (attributing this moratorium on new PLRs to the IRS’s concerns about the process). The 
IRS lifted this moratorium after it amended the PLR procedure in 2011. Rev. Proc. 2011-44, 2011-39 
I.R.B. 447. 
 112 See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text (describing a representative IRS PLR and 
DOL advisory opinion). 
 113 See Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. at 1657 (describing the litigation response as a “wave” of litiga-
tion). 
 114 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–14, 14 n.8, Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. 546 (No. 16-74). 
 115 Rollins v. Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 547 
(2016), and rev’d sub nom. Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) (adopting the narrow interpretation of 
the definition of a church plan); Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517, 519 (7th 
Cir. 2016) (Stapleton I), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016), and rev’d sub nom. Stapleton II, 137 S. 
Ct. 1652 (2017) (same); Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 177 (same). 
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of a motion to dismiss on behalf of the defendants.116 The Third Circuit held 
that the plain language of § 1002(33)(A) and (C) mandates a narrow interpreta-
tion, where (A) is a threshold, or a gatekeeper, for (C).117 In 2016, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in Sta-
pleton v. Advocate Health Care Network (Stapleton I), again looking to the 
plain meaning of the statute, and emphasizing that the word “includes” in sub-
section (C) only modifies who may maintain a church plan.118 Finally, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also came to the same conclusion in 
Rollins v. Dignity Health in 2016.119 Beginning with an analysis of the plain 
language of the statute, the Ninth Circuit also considered the legislative history 
of this provision.120 According to the Ninth Circuit, the legislative history of 
subsection (C) lacked any indication that Congress intended to remove the re-
quirement that churches establish church plans.121 In conclusion, the Third, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all held that a plan maintained by a church-
affiliated organization under subsection (C) must also have been established by 
a church under subsection (A) to be exempt from ERISA.122 
After years of debate among circuit and district courts, the Supreme Court 
finally spoke to the issue of what constitutes a church plan in its 2017 decision 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 187. St. Peter’s Health Care System (St. Peter) is a healthcare system 
loosely affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. See id. at 177 (describing the organization’s con-
nections to the Bishop of Metuchen, New Jersey). It operated its pension plan under ERISA for over 
thirty years, and requested a PLR from the IRS to confirm its church plan status in 2006. Id. at 177–
78. Although the request was pending, employees filed a class action lawsuit alleging that St. Peter’s 
failed to provide necessary plan information as required by ERISA, and that it underfunded the plan 
by upwards of $70 million. Id. at 178. While the lawsuit was still pending, the IRS confirmed St. Pe-
ter’s church plan status through a PLR. Id. Although the court’s narrow interpretation relied primarily 
on the plain text of ERISA, it also acknowledged that IRS PLRs have taken the opposite approach 
when making church plan determinations. Id. at 185. It chose, however, not to pay deference to these 
non-adjudicative memorandums. Id. 
 117 Id. at 181 (citing Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 
1284854, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014), and aff’d, 810 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2015), and cert. granted, 137 
S. Ct. 546 (2016), and rev’d sub nom. Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017)). 
 118 Stapleton I, 817 F.3d at 524–25. A merger between Lutheran General Health System and 
Evangelical Health Systems formed Advocate Health Care Network (Advocate) in 1995. Id. at 520–
21. Advocate’s connection with religious institutions is, therefore, only a contractual one. Id. For an 
in-depth discussion of the effects of mergers and acquisitions on religious affiliations, see Elizabeth 
Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 929, 930 (2018) (describing the phenome-
non of the contractual creation of religious affiliations in the healthcare industry). 
 119 Rollins, 830 F.3d at 903. 
 120 Id. at 905–08. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary 
judgment for the petitioners. Id. at 903. 
 121 Id. at 907–08. 
 122 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)(A), (C)(i) (establishing the definition of a church plan and the 
exemption of such plans from ERISA); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (establishing the definition of a church 
plan); Rollins, 830 F.3d at 903 (adopting the narrow interpretation of the definition of a church plan); 
Stapleton I, 817 F.3d at 519 (same); Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 177 (same). 
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in Stapleton II.123 In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Su-
preme Court embraced the broad interpretation of a church plan and held that a 
church plan need not have been established by a church to qualify for the 
ERISA exemption.124 In this case, the employers from the three circuit court 
decisions appealed from the adverse circuit decisions that denied their inclu-
sion in the church plan exemption.125 The Court began by emphasizing that the 
amended version of § 1002(33)(C)(i) expanded the specific plans that could 
qualify for the church plan exemption.126 Turning to statutory language, the 
Court leaned on a simplified portrayal of the logic problem central to interpret-
ing the statute: “If A is exempt, and A includes C, then C is exempt.”127 The 
Court indicated that if Congress intended to merely qualify the requirement of 
subsection (A) that a church organization maintain the plan, it could have easi-
ly said so.128 
The petitioners, employers who had been denied an exemption, offered a 
hypothetical scenario in their brief that the Court thought to be persuasive.129 
Theoretically, the government could offer a free insurance program to those 
who are disabled and veterans, with an amendment that a person who is disa-
bled and a veteran consists of someone in the National Guard.130 Therefore, a 
non-disabled member of the National Guard would likely be ineligible.131 In 
the same way, the petitioners argued, a plan maintained by a church-affiliated 
organization but not established by a church is not eligible for church plan sta-
tus.132 The majority distinguished this hypothetical from the amendments to 
the church plan definition, and noted as in the hypothetical scenario, the two 
categories of “disabled and a veteran” are highly dissimilar, whereas plans “es-
                                                                                                                           
 123 Stapleton II, 37 S. Ct. at 1656–57. 
 124 Id. at 1663. 
 125 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. 546 (Nos. 16-74, 16-86, 16-258). 
Justice Sotomayor filed a concurrence. Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. at 1663–64 (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring). Justice Gorsuch did not take part in the decision. Id. at 1655 (majority opinion). 
 126 Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. at 1656.  
 127 Id. at 1659 (quoting Overall, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 828). 
 128 Id. The majority opinion cites Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235 (2014). Sta-
pleton II, 137 S. Ct. at 1659. In Lozano, the Supreme Court held that if a legislature does not use lan-
guage that would be a clear substitute, then courts could infer that they did not intend the substitute 
meaning. 134 S. Ct. at 1235 (resolving a dispute regarding the statute of limitations for a petition for 
the return of an abducted child under the Hague Convention).  
 129 Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. at 1659 (citing Brief for Respondents at 22, Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. 
1652 (Nos. 16-74, 16-86, 16-258)). This hypothetical scenario first appeared during oral arguments in 
2015 before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare 
System, and the court cited the hypothetical scenario as persuasive in its decision. 810 F.3d at 181.  
 130 Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. at 1660 (citing Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 22). 
 131 Id. at 1660–61. 
 132 Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 41.130. 
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tablished and maintained . . . by a church” are not.133 Further, the Court be-
lieved that the background knowledge in the hypothetical situation suggested 
that having a disability is a non-negotiable aspect of what Congress would 
have meant in that scenario, whereas in ERISA, it is not so clear.134 
Justice Sotomayor filed a concurrence because she agreed with the statu-
tory interpretation of the majority, but felt that the outcome had the potential 
for broad and unfortunate implications.135 She emphasized that the current size 
and scope of large religiously-affiliated hospital organizations are different 
from those that existed at the time of ERISA’s enactment.136 Further, the scant 
legislative history of the exemption and its amendment worried Justice So-
tomayor; she emphasized the impact of a church plan exemption that includes 
plans neither established nor maintained by an actual church.137 She ended her 
concurrence by noting that, although the plain language of the statute requires 
the broad interpretation of the definition of a church plan, the wording in subsec-
tion (C) mandating that the church-affiliated agency maintaining the church plan 
be a “principal-purpose organization” could be subject to future litigation.138 
D. Current State-Law Remedies for Church Plan Participants 
After the Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of the definition 
of a church plan in Stapleton II, participants and beneficiaries of these plans 
have faced a higher bar when challenging the status of church plans in federal 
court.139 If ERISA exempts a plan from coverage as a church plan, however, 
participants in the plan still have several traditional state-law remedies availa-
ble to them.140 Some scholars have argued that the most viable state-law claims 
are breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, fraud, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress (IIED).141 Subsection 1 briefly examines the ele-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. at 1658–61 (first quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)(C)(i); then quoting 
Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 81). 
 134 Id. at 1660–61. The Court also proposed an altered hypothetical scenario. Id. at 1660. Theoret-
ically, the government could offer the free insurance to anyone who was enlisted and served in the 
Armed Forces, with the amendment that this includes someone who served in the National Guard. Id. 
In this hypothetical, a reader assumes that the person must have enlisted to get the insurance, not that 
the person just served in the Armed Forces or National Guard. Id. This hypothetical scenario, the 
Court concluded, is more akin to the language of the church plan exemption definition. Id. 
 135 Id. at 1663. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 1663–64. 
 139 See id. at 1663 (holding that even if a church did not establish the church plan, it can still qual-
ify for the exemption if a qualifying organization maintains a plan). 
 140 See Maria O’Brien Hylton & Sophie Esquier, The Future of ERISA’s Church Plan Exemption 
After Advocate Health: Abolition or Robust State Law Contract Remedies, in 2018 N.Y.U. REV. EMP. 
BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION §§ 1.01, 1.06(2)(a) (advocating for state-law claims for 
church plan litigants).  
 141 Id. § 1.06(2)(a). 
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ments of each of these claims and their viability for church plan litigants.142 
Subsection 2 discusses another emerging option: state-statutory-law responses, 
tailored to bring church plans in a given state into compliance with narrow 
provisions of ERISA.143 
1. Traditional State-Law Causes of Action 
Breach of contract is currently the most viable state-law claim for church 
plan litigants, as they can typically satisfy each element of the claim.144 Alt-
hough it can vary by jurisdiction, there are traditionally three elements that 
must be satisfied for a breach of contract claim to succeed: the formation of a 
valid contract, a breach of the promise, and a resulting injury.145 In the case of 
pension plans, typically the employer promises in an employment contract that 
it will maintain the employee pension fund in exchange for the employee’s 
service, with a promise to pay those funds to the employee upon retirement.146 
A breach of contract can rise to the level of a tortious breach if it involves 
bad faith.147 About half of all states recognize this cause of action.148 If availa-
ble, this cause of action can be particularly applicable to church plan litigants, 
as anyone with a fiduciary duty over the plan must act with a high standard of 
care.149 Because this cause of action is a tort, more expansive types of damag-
es—including punitive damages—are available.150 
Another potential cause of action for church plan litigants is fraud.151 The 
elements of fraud include misrepresentation, scienter, intent, reliance, and re-
                                                                                                                           
 142 See infra notes 144–157 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 158–164 and accompanying text. 
 144 See O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(2)(a) (focusing on the fact that church 
plan employers would not likely have plausible defenses against a breach of contract claim). 
 145 See, e.g., U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v. Pack Line Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d 868, 871–72 (Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(outlining the requirements for a cause of action for a breach of contract claim under New York State 
law). 
 146 See O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(2)(a) (describing how employers rou-
tinely promise that they will pay a fixed sum to employees after they retire, and then break that prom-
ise). 
 147 Id. § 1.06(2)(b)(i); see Richard J. Kohlman & Robert E. Cartwright, Bad Faith Tort Remedy 
for Breach of Contract, 34 AM. JUR. TRIALS 343, § 1 (originally published 1987) (2020) (noting that 
because there is a bad faith requirement for a tortious breach, there is often an implied covenant of 
good faith applicable to the contract). 
 148 O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(2)(b)(i). 
 149 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (detailing, in general, 
who constitutes a fiduciary and the duties of these individuals). ERISA contains its own requirements 
for who constitutes a fiduciary, and what the duties of a fiduciary are. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114. 
Church plans are, however, exempt from these provisions of ERISA, meaning that they are subject to 
traditional common-law fiduciary laws. See id. § 1003(b)(2) (containing the church plan exemption); 
id. § 1144(a) (preempting state law except in the case of plans exempt under § 1003(b)). 
 150 O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(2)(b)(i). 
 151 Id. § 1.06(2)(b)(ii). 
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sulting injury.152 This cause of action may be applicable to church plan liti-
gants, as exemption from ERISA’s reporting and disclosure requirements has 
allowed several church plan sponsors to misrepresent the level of funding of 
their plans.153 A wide range of damages are available in the context of fraud, 
including punitive damages.154 
Finally, for a claim of IIED, litigants generally need to demonstrate ex-
treme and outrageous conduct, a level of intent, and injury as a result.155 
Scholars have regarded this cause of action as the most far-fetched for church 
plan litigants because litigants must show serious lack of regard for the inter-
ests of plan participants.156 It may nevertheless be viable for those who can 
demonstrate that the sponsor of the plan had the requisite intent and that spon-
sor’s conduct was extreme.157 
2. Emerging State-Law Legislation 
Aside from these common-law remedies, states can also create statutes 
that directly speak to church plans.158 ERISA exempts church plans not only 
from the provisions in Title I, but also from state-law preemption.159 Therefore, 
states have an open door to create legislation that places affirmative duties on 
church plan sponsors.160 
At least one state—Rhode Island—has already tried to enact this type of 
legislation.161 Passed in 2019, the Rhode Island law mandates that all defined-
                                                                                                                           
 152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, 
supra note 140, § 1.06(2)(b)(ii); see, e.g., Found. Capital Res., Inc. v. Prayer Tabernacle Church of 
Love, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00135 (JAM), 2018 WL 4697281, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2018) (outlining 
the elements of a fraud claim). 
 153 O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(2)(b)(ii) (arguing further that by failing to 
inform plan participants about the underfunding of the plan, church plan sponsors intentionally at-
tempt to get plan participants to stay with their employer longer by promising a full pension). 
 154 Id. 
 155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Extreme and outrageous 
conduct is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds 
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. § 46 
cmt. d. 
 156 O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(2)(b)(iii). 
 157 Id. (emphasizing that employees may need to prove that they suffered the requisite level of 
emotional harm because of the non-receipt of their pension funds). 
 158 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (containing the ERISA provision that permits states to legislate re-
garding exempted plans); e.g., 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-7.1-4 (2019) (requiring church plans within 
Rhode Island to comply with certain provisions of ERISA). 
 159 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 160 Id. ERISA places affirmative duties on sponsors of typical defined-benefit pension plans, such 
as duties to disclose financial information to plan participants periodically. See 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1023(a)(1)(A). Church plan sponsors, however, are exempt from these requirements. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1003(b)(2). 
 161 See 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-7.1-4 (codifying legislation encompassing church plans exempt 
from ERISA). The collapse of a church plan sponsored by St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island 
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benefit plans exempt from ERISA (except governmental plans) follow a spe-
cific disclosure requirement of ERISA that obligates employers to provide em-
ployees with an annual report about the plan fund.162 The passage of this law 
appears to have gone by with little fanfare, but constitutes a new way of regu-
lating church plans outside of ERISA.163 As Rhode Island General Treasurer 
Seth Magaziner put it, this law works by closing a narrow loophole to ensure 
that plan sponsors must at least inform participants and beneficiaries about the 
financial status of the plan.164 
II. POST-STAPLETON II LITIGATION 
In the years since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Advocate 
Health Care Network v. Stapleton (Stapleton II), church plan pensioners have 
continued to face underfunding of their pension plans and a lack of disclosure 
about the financial health of the plan fund from their employers.165 As a result 
of the Supreme Court’s decision, they also face a higher bar to argue that their 
pension plan is not a church plan in order to sue under ERISA in federal 
                                                                                                                           
(St. Joseph) caused Rhode Island to take this legislative action. See Katie Mulvaney, Class-Action 
Lawsuits Filed in St. Joseph’s Pension Collapse, PROVIDENCE J. (June 19, 2018), https://www.
providencejournal.com/news/20180619/class-action-lawsuits-filed-in-st-josephs-pension-collapse 
[https://perma.cc/5HAU-B3FC] (detailing the St. Joseph pension fund collapse in 2018); David Pow-
ell, Rhode Island Enacts Law to Require Church Defined Benefit Plans with at Least 200 Members to 
Provide Financial Information, GROOM L. GROUP (July 8, 2019), https://www.groom.com/resources/
rhode-island-enacts-law-to-require-church-defined-benefit-plans-with-at-least-200-members-to-
provide-financial-information/ [https://perma.cc/AUF6-KBBT] (announcing the new Rhode Island 
law, and then attributing it to a hospital pension plan collapse in Providence). 
 162 An Act Relating to Labor and Labor Relations–Non-ERISA Covered Pension Plans, ch. 52, 
§ 1, 2019 R.I. Pub. Laws 147 (codified at 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-7.1-4). Specifically, the law man-
dates that all defined-benefit plans exempt from ERISA, except governmental plans, comply with 29 
U.S.C. § 1024(b)(3). Id.; see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1024(b)(3) (relating to annual plan reporting). This provi-
sion of ERISA mandates that plan administrators must give a copy of statements and schedules to 
summarize their annual report to each participant in the plan each year. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1024(b)(3). 
 163 See Hazel Bradford, New Tactics Being Deployed in Challenging Church Plans, PENSIONS & 
INV. (May 27, 2019), https://www.pionline.com/article/20190527/PRINT/190529878/new-tactics-
being-deployed-in-challenging-church-plans [https://perma.cc/CH5P-WV7H] (framing this legislation 
as an example of a state court tactic for church plans). 
 164 Press Release, Seth Magaziner, Office of General Treasurer, Treasurer Magaziner Commends 
Rhode Island Legislators for Passing Bills to Close “Church Run” Pension Loophole (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.ri.gov/press/view/35909 [https://perma.cc/G5C5-QZAW]. The Rhode Island House Ma-
jority Leader also characterized this law as a common-sense piece of legislation protecting workers in 
the state. Id. 
 165 See Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton (Stapleton II), 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (2017) 
(adopting a broad interpretation of the church plan definition, thereby making it harder for retirees to 
challenge the church plan status of their pension plan sponsor); e.g., Boden v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1083 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (deciding a case involving severe underfunding of a 
plan).  
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court.166 Part II of this Note examines a few examples of litigation post-
Stapleton II, with an emphasis on litigation strategies, new and unresolved is-
sues, and success rates.167 As these representative case studies demonstrate, 
litigants are now pursuing creative arguments in court, such as challenging the 
definition of a “principal-purpose organization,” settling with their plan spon-
sors, and pursuing traditional state-law claims.168 
A. The Principal-Purpose Debate: Boden v. St. Elizabeth  
Medical Center, Inc. 
St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. (St. Elizabeth) is a non-profit health 
care provider headquartered in Kentucky that operates throughout Northern 
Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana.169 The Franciscan Sisters of the Poor established 
St. Elizabeth in 1861.170 In 2016, several former nurses who worked for St. 
Elizabeth and continued to participate in its defined-benefit pension plan sued 
St. Elizabeth, as well as members of the St. Elizabeth Medical Center Employ-
ee’s Pension Plan Administrative Committee (Committee).171 Unlike other 
church plan cases, the employer did not actually deny any employees of their 
pension benefits.172 Rather, the participants sued because St. Elizabeth under-
funded the plan by more than $166 million.173 Prior to Stapleton II, the plain-
tiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in 
2016, claiming federal jurisdiction under the basis that St. Elizabeth did not 
have an ERISA-exempt church plan.174 In their original complaint, the plain-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. at 1656 (adopting the broad interpretation of the definition of a 
church plan). 
 167 See infra notes 169–223 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 169–223 and accompanying text (containing three representative case studies 
of post-Stapleton II church plan litigation).  
 169 Amended Complaint at 5, Boden, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (No. 2:16-cv-00049). 
 170 Boden, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1083. 
 171 Amended Complaint, supra note 169, at 4–5. Each of the plaintiffs in this case were former 
nurses, and each worked for St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. (St. Elizabeth) for at least seventeen 
years. Id. One of the plaintiffs worked for the medical center for thirty-one years. Id. at 4. As in other 
church plan cases, these pensioners had an incentive to work at St. Elizabeth for many years, as the 
terms of their defined-benefit plan calculated their retirement income in relation to their length of 
service and income while working. See id. at 2 (describing the terms of the St. Elizabeth plan). 
 172 See id. at 2–3 (establishing the basis for a cause of action related to the underfunding of the 
plan). 
 173 Id. (detailing the plaintiffs’ claims, which sought to compel St. Elizabeth to comply with 
ERISA’s funding, fiduciary, and notice requirement, as well as pay damages). Alternatively, if the 
plan was found to not be subject to ERISA, the plaintiffs would argue breach of contract and breach of 
duty under state law. Id. Additionally, in 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Thole v. U.S. Bank 
N.A. 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1616 (2020). In that case, the question was whether plaintiffs have standing to 
sue in ERISA cases if they have not actually lost their retirement income. Id. at 1618–19. The Court 
ultimately held that the plaintiffs in Thole did not have Article III standing to sue because they had not 
actually been denied their retirement income. Id. 
 174 Complaint at 1–2, Boden, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (No. 2:16-cv-00049). 
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tiffs argued that the plan was neither established nor maintained by a church, 
but rather by St. Elizabeth, a church-affiliated health care organization.175 After 
the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, the district court granted a stay until 
the Supreme Court decided Stapleton II.176 They argued that the plan, even 
under Stapleton II’s broad definition, was not a church plan because an organi-
zation maintained it whose principal purpose was the delivery of health care, 
and not the administration of pension funds.177 
This argument did not persuade the district court.178 The Supreme Court 
in Stapleton II clarified that a pension plan could simply be maintained by a 
principal-purpose organization controlled by or associated with a church, but it 
did not specify what qualified as a “principal-purpose organization.”179 The 
Boden district court adopted a three-part test, to determine whether a plan 
maintained by a principal-purpose organization met the Stapleton II church 
plan requirements.180 First, the court must ask whether the entity in question is 
tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and affiliated with a church.181 If so, the 
court must ask whether an organization—with the principal purpose of admin-
istering the plan—maintains the entity’s plan.182 Finally, the court asks wheth-
er the principal-purpose organization is affiliated with a church.183 
As a threshold matter, the Eastern District of Kentucky found that St. 
Elizabeth satisfied the first prong of the test, as a tax-exempt non-profit with 
sufficient ties to the Catholic Church.184 In addressing the second prong, the 
court decided that the Committee counted as an “organization,” even though it 
                                                                                                                           
 175 Id. at 2. 
 176 Boden, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1080. In fact, the defendants in Boden v. St. Elizabeth Medical Cen-
ter filed an amicus brief in support of the Stapleton II petitioners. Brief of Amicus Curiae Saint Eliza-
beth Medical Center, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 7, Stapleton II, 137 S. Ct. 1654 (Nos. 16-74, 16-
86, 16-268). The defendants promoted a broad reading of ERISA, arguing that a narrow reading of the 
definition of a church plan would require the courts to be in the business of measuring the religiosity 
of church-affiliated institutions. Id. They further argued that a narrow reading would disadvantage 
church-affiliated non-profits that had relied upon IRS analyses of ERISA. Id. at 7–9. 
 177 Amended Complaint, supra note 169, at 2. 
 178 See Boden, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1079–80 (granting the defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment). 
 179 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)I(i) 
(West 2019) (setting forth the requirement of a principal-purpose organization); Stapleton II, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1656–57 (interpreting this provision of ERISA, but failing to define a principal-purpose organi-
zation). 
 180 Boden, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1082 (citing Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 877 F.3d 1213, 
1222 (10th Cir. 2017)). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 1082–83. The Franciscan Sisters of the Poor founded St. Elizabeth in 1861, and the 
Bishop of Covington retains control over certain facets of St. Elizabeth’s operations. Id. at 1083. Fur-
ther, there are crucifixes in most rooms in St. Elizabeth’s facilities, including every patient room, and 
it transmits a prayer through its hospitals twice a day. Id. at 1083–84. 
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was comprised of internal committees.185 It found that the Committee indeed 
“maintained” the plan within the meaning of ERISA’s church plan defini-
tion.186 Based on the plain meaning of the word “maintained,” as well as statu-
tory structure and additional case law, the court determined that “maintained” 
meant something more than administered, but did not require the “ability to 
amend or terminate the plan.”187 Instead, the court concluded that “mainte-
nance” included all the actions necessary to continue the plan.188 Finally, the 
court determined that the Committee was associated with a church.189 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the Committee was a principal-purpose organization 
within the meaning of the church plan exemption.190 
In the end, the court re-affirmed that St. Elizabeth’s pension plan was an 
ERISA-exempt church plan.191 This conclusion was largely based on the broad 
interpretation of a church plan adopted in Stapleton II.192 The court dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ claims, and as a result, waived jurisdiction over any additional 
claims, noting that the plaintiffs could re-file in state court if they so choose.193 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Id. at 1084–93 (determining that the St. Elizabeth Medical Center Employee’s Pension Plan 
Administrative Committee (Committee) was a principal-purpose organization). Because ERISA does 
not define the term “organization,” the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky looked 
to the dictionary definition of the term. Id. at 1085. Under that definition, an “organization” need only 
be a group with a specified reason, and does not need to be completely separate from other entities. Id. 
The language of St. Elizabeth’s plan documents describes the Committee as a group with a specified 
purpose, both requirements of the dictionary definition of an “organization.” Id. at 1085–86. 
 186 Id. at 1086–92. 
 187 Id. at 1086–93 (first citing Medina, 877 F.3d at 1225; then citing Sanzone v. Mercy Health, 
326 F. Supp. 3d 795, 795, 804 (E.D. Mo. 2018)). 
 188 Id. Further, an internal-benefits committee can maintain a plan. Id. at 1088–89. A court may 
decide on whether such a committee maintains a plan within the meaning of ERISA by relying on 
formal plan documents instead of the actual day-to-day functioning of the committee. Id. at 1089–92. 
 189 Id. at 1093–94. Specifically, the Committee’s administration of the pension plan was its prin-
cipal purpose. Id. at 1093. Again, looking to the dictionary definition of “principal purpose,” the court 
defined the term as the primary goal or objective of the organization. Id. at 1092 (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1002(33)(C)(i)). The court concluded because St. Elizabeth is associated with a church, and the 
Committee is a subset of St. Elizabeth, the Committee is associated with a church as well. Id. at 1093. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 1094; see also Danielle Nichole Smith, Ky. Hospital Defeats ERISA Suit Over Church 
Plan Exemption, LAW360 (July 25, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1182187/ky-hospital-
defeats-erisa-suit-over-church-plan-exemption [https://perma.cc/W4LG-M4S5] (reporting on St. Eliz-
abeth’s successful motion for partial summary judgment). 
 192 See Boden, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1081–82 (establishing Stapleton II’s interpretation as the 
framework for analyzing St. Elizabeth’s plan). 
 193 Id. at 1095. 
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B. Settling Out of Court: Owens v. St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc. 
In 2012, St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc. (St. Anthony) notified employ-
ees that it was terminating its employee pension plan.194 Although the trust 
funding plan would continue to pay distributions, it would reduce benefits by 
up to forty percent for certain participants.195 St. Anthony is associated with 
the Franciscan Sisters of Chicago Service Corporation, a non-profit corpora-
tion that runs assisted living and hospice facilities through a network of affili-
ates.196 In or around 1989, the IRS sent St. Anthony a PLR verifying its church 
plan status, a determination that authorized St. Anthony to stop complying with 
ERISA’s disclosure, insurance, and funding requirements.197 In response to the 
plan termination, a group of former employees filed suit in 2014 against St. 
Anthony in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Eastern 
Division).198 The plaintiffs alleged that the plan was not a church plan under 
ERISA, along with other ERISA violations including a breach of fiduciary du-
ty.199 The defendant employer filed a motion to dismiss, which the court sus-
pended pending resolution of Stapleton II.200 
In 2018, the court reconsidered a new motion to dismiss by the defend-
ants, with additional state-law claims.201 This case was short-lived, however; in 
2019, the parties reportedly settled for four million dollars.202 According to the 
                                                                                                                           
 194 Owens v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc. (Owens II), No. 14-cv-4068, 2018 WL 4682337, at *2–3 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2018). St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc. (St. Anthony) underfunded the plan by 
$35 million in 2009, but insisted that participants would still receive their benefits. Id. at *2. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at *1. 
 197 Id. at *2. In 1999, the Franciscan Sisters of Chicago Service Corporation sold St. Anthony to 
the Franciscan Alliance, and St. Anthony froze the pension fund before this sale, essentially disallow-
ing any new employees from participating. See id. (describing the remaining interests in the pension 
plan for then-existing employees). 
 198 Owens v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc. (Owens I), No. 14-cv-4068, 2015 WL 3819086, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. June 18, 2015). 
 199 See id. at *2 (outlining the plaintiffs’ various claims). The U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois (Eastern Division) denied the plaintiffs’ first application from class certification in 
2014, as the Supreme Court announced it would rule on the Stapleton II case. Danielle Nichole Smith, 
Indiana Hospital Plan Participants Seek Cert. in Benefits Suit, LAW360 (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.
law360.com/articles/1098213 [https://perma.cc/FM6D-C9EF]. 
 200 Owens I, 2015 WL 3819086, at *4. 
 201 Owens II, 2018 WL 4682337, at *1, *6. The court only dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, 
but all other claims survived dismissal. Id. at *9; see Danielle Nichole Smith, Indiana Hospital Can’t 
Escape Suit Over Benefits Rollback, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1087827 [https://perma.cc/2MKA-LK6N] (summarizing the decision to grant in part and dismiss in 
part the defendants’ motion to dismiss in Owens v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc. (Owens II)). The dis-
trict court dismissed the claim for unjust enrichment because the plaintiffs argued alternatively for 
breach of contract, and noted that an unjust enrichment claim rests on the idea that there was no for-
mal contract. Owens II, 2018 WL 4682337, at *8. Therefore, the court concluded that the claims must 
be pled as alternatives to one another, which the plaintiffs failed to do. Id. 
 202 Adam Lidgett, Hospital to Shell Out $4M to Wrap Up Church Plan Suit, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 
2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1148995?scroll=1&related=1 [https://perma.cc/XCP5-27UY]. 
3034 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:3007 
plaintiffs, one million dollars of the settlement went to attorneys’ fees and in-
centive awards for the named pensioners, and the other three million dollars 
went to the 1,900-member class of plan participants.203 
C. (Re)turning to State Common Law: Hartshorne v. Roman  
Catholic Diocese of Albany, NY 
The 2018 lawsuit brought by former employees of St. Clare’s in Harts-
horne v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New York is one of the newest and 
most notable examples of church plan litigation post-Stapleton II.204 The com-
plaint in this case raised three state-law claims under New York law: breach of 
contract, promissory estoppel claim, and breach of fiduciary duty.205 The plain-
tiffs did not dispute that the plan at issue is a church plan, nor that the Albany 
Diocese manages St. Clare’s.206 In fact, the plaintiffs emphasized the involve-
ment of the Albany Diocese in the management of St. Clare’s, as it helped es-
tablish that the Albany Diocese is the party responsible for the mismanagement 
of funds.207 
The plaintiffs began their complaint by noting that New York law consid-
ers retirement plans to be “wage supplements”; therefore, if an employer does 
not make payment under a retirement plan, a court can find it guilty of a mis-
demeanor.208 Consequently, the employees could sue for these benefits in state 
court.209 
The plaintiffs first raised a breach of contract claim.210 According to the 
plaintiffs, the defendants breached their contract by representing in the plan 
documents and the SPD that St. Clare’s would fund the plan—not change the 
plan in a way that would negatively affect benefits—and continue to abide by 
ERISA even though the plan was exempt from coverage.211 
                                                                                                                           
 203 Id. 
 204 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 4 (commencing the lawsuit by participants in the St. Clare’s 
Plan against the Albany Diocese); Arnold, supra note 1 (describing the St. Clare lawsuit). 
 205 Complaint, supra note 3, at 4. 
 206 See id. (lacking a claim that the plan is not an ERISA-exempt church plan). 
 207 See id. at 6–8. For instance, the complaint notes that St. Clare’s was listed in the official Cath-
olic directory, and that the Chairman of the St. Clare’s Board of Directors was also employed by the 
Albany Diocese as a liaison to local Catholic hospitals. Id. at 8. 
 208 Id. at 11; see N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198-c (McKinney 2019). 
 209 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 11 (arguing that litigants can enforce their rights to their em-
ployee-benefit plans in state court because New York State law considers these plans to be “wage 
supplements”). 
 210 Id. To establish a breach of contract under the common law of New York, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that it formed a contract with the defendant, the plaintiff performed its duties under the 
contract but the defendant failed to perform, and an injury resulted from such failure to perform. Id. 
(citing Clearmont Prop., LLC v. Eisner, 872 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728 (App. Div. 2009)). 
 211 Id. at 21–22. 
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The plaintiffs then asserted a related claim for promissory estoppel.212 To 
establish a promissory estoppel claim under New York common law, a plaintiff 
must show that although there was no contract, the plaintiff reasonably relied 
upon a clear promise made by the defendant to the plaintiff’s detriment.213 The 
plaintiffs emphasized that they had made decisions about their employment 
with the expectation that after five years of service, their right to pension bene-
fits would vest—a fact that St. Clare’s should have reasonably anticipated giv-
en its promises.214 
Finally, the plaintiffs put forth a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty.215 A 
fiduciary relationship exists under New York common law when an entity or 
person is under an obligation to act for the benefit of another within the scope 
of a special relationship.216 To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, one must 
show that this special relationship of trust existed for the benefit of the plain-
tiff, that an entity or person breached their duty related to that trust, and that 
the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result.217 The plaintiffs alleged that St. 
Clare’s breached its fiduciary duties, specifically its duty of prudence in man-
agement of the plan and its duty of disclosure.218 
Since filing their complaint, the plaintiffs in Hartshorne survived a mo-
tion to dismiss brought by the defendants.219 In their motion, the defendants 
alleged that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not set forth a case, that the complaint 
constituted inadmissible documentary evidence, and that the plaintiffs missed 
the statute of limitations for their breach of contract claims.220 The N.Y. State 
Supreme Court, County of Schenectady rejected each of these arguments by 
the defendants.221 The court’s decision traced the history of the St. Clare’s plan 
and emphasized the number of times St. Clare’s promised plan participants 
that they would receive their pensions.222 The court’s rejection of a motion to 
                                                                                                                           
 212 Id. at 22. 
 213 Id. at 12 (citing Fleet Bank v. Pine Knoll Corp., 736 N.Y.S.2d 737, 742 (App. Div. 2002)). 
 214 Id. at 22–23. 
 215 Id. at 24. St. Clare’s Plan participants argued that St. Clare’s had its own self-imposed fiduci-
ary duty stemming from the plan’s Summary Plan Description. Id. at 13–14. 
 216 Id. (citing EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31 (N.Y. 2005)). 
 217 Id. (citing Ne. Gen. Corp. v. Wellington Advert., Inc., 624 N.E.2d 129, 129–31 (N.Y. 1993)). 
 218 Id. at 24–26. The plaintiffs alleged that St. Clare’s and the Albany Diocese received a grant 
from New York State of $28.5 million to completely fund the pension plan in 2008. Id. at 18. After-
wards, in 2009, St. Clare’s wrote to plan participants to assure them that they would receive their 
pension. Id. at 19. From 2010 to 2017, St. Clare’s continued to send letters to the plaintiffs reassuring 
them of the health of the pension fund, even after the plan’s deficit increased from around $13 million 
to $32 million in 2014. Id. In 2016, St. Clare’s told participants for the first time that it may not be 
able to meet its pension obligations, but this letter and subsequent ones suggested participants would 
continue to receive payments for another nine years. Id. at 19–20. 
 219 See Decision/Order, supra note 10, at 19. 
 220 Id. at 2. 
 221 Id. at 10–20. 
 222 Id. at 2–10. 
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dismiss indicates that, in cases with a high level of reliance by plan partici-
pants on promises made by plan administrators, state courts are willing to at 
least decide on the merits for claims of breach of contract, promissory estop-
pel, and breach of fiduciary duty.223 
III. CHURCH PLAN REFORM: A CALL AND A RESPONSE 
Church plan litigation in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 deci-
sion in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton (Stapleton II) demonstrates 
that the exemption exposes participants and beneficiaries of church plans to tre-
mendous risk, with little recourse in federal or state courts.224 This Part focuses 
on a path forward.225 Section A is a call for reform.226 It argues that the church 
plan exemption currently undermines the statutory intent of ERISA, that the ex-
emption’s justification has become irrelevant, and that competing incentives jus-
tify change.227 Section B focuses on potential solutions, emphasizing the efficacy 
of state statutory law protections for church plan participants.228 
A. The Call for Action 
The church plan exemption undermines the purpose behind ERISA and 
congressional intent.229 When enacting ERISA, Congress justified its action by 
citing its powers under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.230 And, 
indeed, the welfare of the U.S. pension system is a matter of national concern, 
affecting the security that Americans feel knowing that they can retire with 
dignity.231 Indeed, the church plan exemption itself has an impact on the na-
                                                                                                                           
 223 See id. at 18 (noting that the plaintiffs in this case argued that the Albany Diocese and St. 
Clare’s both knew the grant they received from the state of New York to cover the pension fund 
would not be enough to meet their obligations, and yet they continued to reassure participants about 
the health of the plan fund). 
 224 See, e.g., Boden v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1094 (E.D. Ky. 2019) 
(holding that the plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a church plan, and therefore could not sue under 
ERISA in federal court). 
 225 See infra notes 229–272 and accompanying text. 
 226 See infra notes 229–250 and accompanying text. 
 227 See infra notes 229–250 and accompanying text. 
 228 See infra notes 251–272 and accompanying text. 
 229 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2018) (containing the church plan exemption); Stein, supra note 
81 (describing the legislative intent behind the church plan exemption). 
 230 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (setting forth Congress’s right “[t]o 
regulate [interstate] Commerce”). Congress also justified its action by referencing the federal taxing 
power. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (setting forth Congress’s right to imple-
ment federal taxes). It specified that the regulation of retirement benefits in the United States falls 
under its taxing authority because benefit plans receive preferential tax treatment; therefore the regula-
tion of these plans is important to protecting federal revenue streams. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). 
 231 See Survey Reveals Why Seniors Are Putting Off Retirement, PROVISION LIVING, https://www.
provisionliving.com/news/survey-reveals-why-seniors-are-putting-retirement [https://perma.cc/JP35-
G9QT] (summarizing the findings of a 2019 study concerning attitudes toward retirement among 
2020] ERISA Church Plan Litigation in the Aftermath of Stapleton 3037 
tional retirement system, as retirement plans are used by companies to compete 
for workers as part of a comprehensive benefits package.232 Therefore, if one 
organization complies with ERISA and its obligations, including paying PBGC 
premiums, hiring additional plan administrators, and meeting ERISA’s vesting 
and funding obligations, that organization is at a disadvantage compared to 
those that do not.233 This creates a disincentive for church plans to opt in to 
coverage and gives religious plan sponsors an advantage in the marketplace.234 
Consequently, this undermines the congressional intent of regulating interstate 
commerce.235 
Further, when church plan participants cannot avail themselves of 
ERISA’s protections, they are placed in a similar position to Studebaker-
Packard employees prior to the enactment of ERISA.236 First, by allowing the 
church plan exemption to continue, Congress is placing countless workers in a 
position where they must seek state common-law protections when employers 
fail to fulfill pension obligations.237 Before the enactment of ERISA, pension-
ers, such as Studebaker-Packard former employees, had to rely on the meager 
protection afforded by state-law claims.238 Church plan litigants now face a 
similar lack of predictability and recourse related to their pensions, further 
highlighting how the church plan exemption cuts against the congressional 
intent of ERISA.239 ERISA was also a direct congressional response to the real 
                                                                                                                           
seniors). Provision Living’s recent survey of over 1,000 seniors (between the ages of 65 and 85) found 
that their average anticipated age of retirement was 72 years old, and for the seniors who were still 
working, 62% of them indicated it was for financial reasons. Id. 37% of respondents listed their pen-
sion as one of their income sources during retirement, and 70% listed social security. Id. 
 232 See Amended Complaint, supra note 169, at 3 (arguing that St. Elizabeth’s received an ad-
vantage over its competition by not complying with ERISA, particularly by not paying PBGC premi-
ums). 
 233 See id. 
 234 See, e.g., id. (presenting just one example of a church organization allegedly having a competi-
tive advantage over peer institutions because of its church plan status). 
 235 See id. The congressional findings portion of ERISA emphasizes that employee-benefit plans 
affect industrial relations on an interstate level, and “stability of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). If 
the goal of ERISA was to act upon Congress’s power to regulate this kind of interstate economic ac-
tivity, exempting church plans seems as if it would have the opposite effect, by de-stabilizing labor 
relations and employment security. See id. 
 236 See WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 42, at 51 (describing the effect 
of the Studebaker-Packard plant’s closing on participants in its pension plan). 
 237 See O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(2)(a) (noting that church plan plaintiffs 
seeking relief may need to turn to state-law claims). 
 238 See WOOTEN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 42, at 51 (describing the Stu-
debaker-Packard case, wherein workers lost their pensions with no recourse in federal law, and noting 
that because they were unprotected by pension insurance, they were left to pursue state-law claims). 
 239 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 20–21 (recounting the St. Clare’s case, wherein 600 workers 
lost some or all of their pension with no recourse in federal court because of the church plan exemp-
tion). 
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human effects of the Studebaker-Packard plant’s closing.240 In that case, em-
ployees faced the same issues church plan pensioners do now: lack of account-
ability from their employer, as well as a lack of recourse if something goes 
awry.241 The real human effects are not only retirees left without their expected 
post-retirement income, but also retirees who remained at a job offering a de-
fined-benefit plan specifically because of its financial reassurance.242 
Recent church plan litigation demonstrates that the reality of modern 
church organizations undermines the intent behind the church plan exemption 
itself.243 Most modern church plan litigation centers around Catholic-affiliated 
hospital networks.244 The Catholic Church is currently suffering worldwide fi-
nancial difficulties because of priest sexual abuse allegations.245 With church 
organizations in a precarious financial state, protecting retirees relying upon pen-
sion plans managed by these organizations becomes even more important.246 
Additionally, when Congress enacted the church plan exemption, one jus-
tification given was that churches would handle these funds in a more ethical 
manner than other organizations.247 Not only is confidence in the ethical be-
havior of churches eroding, but church organizations have demonstrated 
through their (mis)management of employee pension funds and failure to opt 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See Wooten, The Studebaker-Packard Story, supra note 43 at 684 (demonstrating the effect of 
the Studebaker-Packard plant’s closing and the impact on the pension plans of retirees, which moti-
vated lawmakers to enact ERISA). 
 241 See id. (recounting Studebaker-Packard’s role in ERISA’s legislative and political history). 
 242 See Emily Brandon, Staying at a Job for the Retirement Plan: Workers with 401(k)’s Are 
More Likely to Job Hop Than Employees with Pensions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (Dec. 14, 2010), 
https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/planning-to-retire/2010/12/14/staying-at-a-job-for-the-
retirement-plan [https://web.archive.org/web/20131023013019/https://money.usnews.com/money/
blogs/planning-to-retire/2010/12/14/staying-at-a-job-for-the-retirement-plan] (reporting that 59% of 
pensioners stay at their current job at least in part because of the promise of their pension plan). 
 243 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a), 1003(b)(2); e.g., Morrison, supra note 104, at 1292–93, 1315–22 
(advocating for closer IRS fact-finding in the PLR process when reviewing a plan sponsor’s degree of 
religious connection). 
 244 See, e.g., Boden, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1076 (describing St. Elizabeth’s connection with the 
Catholic Church). Furthermore, the prevalence of Catholic hospitals in church plan litigation is no 
surprise; Catholic healthcare systems make up a sizable portion of the U.S. healthcare system. See 
LOIS UTTLEY & CHRISTINE KHAIKIN, MERGERWATCH, GROWTH OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND 
HEALTH SYSTEMS: 2016 UPDATE OF THE MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE REPORT 1 (2016), http://
static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/816571/27061007/1465224862580/MW_Update-2016-MiscarrOf
Medicine-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/646B-AG5S] (noting that in 2016, the Catholic Church owned 
or operated 14.5% of the acute care hospitals in the United States). 
 245 See Tom Gjelten, The Clergy Abuse Crisis Has Cost the Catholic Church $3 Billion, NPR 
(Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/18/639698062/the-clergy-abuse-crisis-has-cost-the-
catholic-church-3-billion [https://perma.cc/NG8E-JPPL] (reporting that as of 2018, the Catholic 
Church nationally has paid out $3 billion in sexual abuse settlements, and at least nineteen dioceses in 
the United States have been forced to file for bankruptcy as a result). 
 246 See id. (describing the financial state of Catholic institutions). 
 247 See Stein, supra note 85 (recounting a letter in the Congressional Record from the Pension 
Fund of the Catholic Church emphasizing its intention to manage these funds with Christian values). 
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in to ERISA compliance that they can fail to reliably fund and insure promised 
pension plans.248 
Finally, the reality is that many modern church organizations are 
healthcare organizations that are only loosely connected to a religious mis-
sion.249 Therefore, the Establishment Clause’s concern of maintaining separa-
tion of church and state becomes less important for these organizations.250 
B. The Response 
This Note joins with others to ultimately advocate for Congress to narrow 
the church plan exemption to plan sponsors who have pension plans for em-
ployees carrying out essential religious work.251 Such a response, however, 
may be too far off and not politically feasible.252 Therefore, in the meantime, 
there is another approach: states should step in and create legislation around 
church plans.253 
Of course, church plan litigants can sue under traditional state laws, using 
causes of action such as breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty.254 
These remedies, however, only provide recourse after an employer falls short 
of its obligations by, for example, failing to fund a plan, creating a prohibitive-
ly high vesting requirement, or failing to report and disclose the financial sta-
tus of the plan.255 In contrast, ERISA places affirmative duties upon the spon-
sors of traditional defined-benefit pension plans, which protect pensioners be-
fore anything goes awry, and if the plan participants have no other recourse 
                                                                                                                           
 248 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Many U.S. Catholics Question Their Membership Amid Scandal, GALLUP 
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/247571/catholics-question-membership-amid-scandal.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/92AY-8XCY] (reporting that in the aftermath of priest sexual abuse scandals, 37% 
of Catholics in the United States “questioned whether [they] would remain in the Catholic [C]hurch” 
as of 2019); Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Church Membership Down Sharply in Past Two Decades, GALLUP 
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/248837/church-membership-down-sharply-past-two-
decades.aspx [https://perma.cc/9CKZ-853U] (reporting that only half of all Americans belong to a 
church, a number that was 70% in 1999). 
 249 See, e.g., supra notes 194–203 and accompanying text (describing the case of Owens v. St. 
Anthony Medical Center, Inc.). 
 250 See S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 81 (1973) (commenting on the Establishment Clause’s motivations 
behind the church plan exemption). 
 251 See O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(1) (advocating for Congress to abolish 
the church plan exemption except in cases where regulation would result in a substantial entanglement 
of religious affairs). But see Morrison, supra note 104, at 1309–10 (noting that one potential problem 
with limiting church plan coverage to churches “in the brick-and-mortar sense only” would result in a 
favoring of religions with hierarchical structures as opposed to congregational structures). 
 252 O’Brien Hylton & Esquier, supra note 140, § 1.06(1). 
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dies for church plan litigants). 
 255 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 3, at 4 (containing the state-law claims by former employees 
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against their plan sponsor under state laws.256 Pensioners under such plans can 
work and retire with more confidence in their plan funds.257 These employees 
have confidence their employer is being forthcoming about the status of the 
pension fund and that they will be covered by pension insurance if the plans 
terminate.258 This is a stark contrast to church plan litigants, who are forced to 
file class action lawsuits after suddenly learning that their employers will no 
longer pay their pensions.259 
A promising and innovative option to protect church plan litigants is the 
enactment of narrowly tailored state-law legislation that places affirmative du-
ties on church plan sponsors.260 Rhode Island is the trailblazer on this type of 
legislation, passing a law in 2019 that brought church plans under ERISA’s 
annual reporting requirement.261 Rhode Island officials explain the benefits of 
such legislation are numerous.262 First, state laws can be narrowly tailored to 
address the specific needs of church plan beneficiaries in a particular region.263 
For example, legislation could bring plans under the funding or vesting re-
quirements of ERISA instead of annual reporting, if that better fit the needs of 
a given jurisdiction.264 Second, state-law legislation such as Rhode Island’s 
avoids Congress’s Establishment Clause concerns about looking into church 
finances.265 If plan sponsors only give annual reports to plan participants, and 
not to the government, then participants are equipped with the knowledge they 
                                                                                                                           
 256 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1191c (containing the requirements imposed by Title I of ERISA); see 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 83 (noting that Studebaker-Packard had not actually 
breached any elements of its contracts with employees or engaged in blatantly fraudulent behavior, 
allowing the corporation to avoid liability under typical state-law breach of contract). 
 257 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1191c (placing a myriad of affirmative duties on traditional employee-
benefit plan sponsors). 
 258 See id. 
 259 See, e.g., Owens v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 14-cv-4068, 2018 WL 4682337, at *2–3 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2018) (describing the origins of the St. Anthony lawsuit). 
 260 See, e.g., 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-7.1-4 (codifying legislation encompassing ERISA-exempt 
church plans). 
 261 See id.; supra notes 158–164 and accompanying text (describing the recent Rhode Island leg-
islation). 
 262 See Press Release, Seth Magaziner, Office of General Treasurer, supra note 164 (quoting 
several Rhode Island officials commenting on this law). 
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cc%2D4176%2Da2f8%2D8d4beebdf488 [https://perma.cc/5J4W-EDWG] (commenting that St. Jo-
seph in Rhode Island allegedly failed to be transparent about the funding of the plan, leading to the 
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quirement, and not any of ERISA’s other provisions). 
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need, without any mingling of church and state.266 Finally, statutes such as 
these give a clear cause of action to church plan litigants; these litigants no 
longer need to try to fit their claims into existing state-law causes of action 
such as a breach of contract claim.267 
One could argue that this legislation does not go far enough.268 A report-
ing and disclosure requirement may not be helpful if church plans are still not 
subject to vesting and funding standards, or are not covered by PBGC insur-
ance.269 If plan participants can catch problems with funding early on, howev-
er, this could protect workers while putting pressure on employers.270 Workers 
could have the option to make different employment decisions earlier if they 
knew that the employer was underfunding its pension plan.271 State-law regula-
tion of church plans is a step in the right direction, and sends the message to 
employers that if they avoid ERISA coverage, then they expose themselves to 
state regulation.272 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, lawmakers intended to protect 
the rights of workers who receive employee benefits, particularly pensions. 
Congress barely discussed or justified the church plan exemption, but it has led 
to extensive administrative and judicial debate, as well as the loss of anticipat-
ed benefits for countless pensioners. Litigation following the Supreme Court’s 
2017 decision in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton demonstrates that 
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litigants now have a slim chance of succeeding in federal court, and must rely 
on state-law claims and settlement agreements to hold their employers ac-
countable to their pension obligations. To protect vulnerable retirees, Congress 
could act to amend the church plan exemption, or states can and should act on 
their own to regulate church plans. Absent such protective measures, countless 
current and future retirees are left exposed to financial instability. 
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